Following concerns from animal rights campaigners in several member states about the cruelty of seal hunting

As Member States had introduced national laws restricting or banning marketing of seal products which could result in a fragmentation of the internal market, because the different rules would mean that traders had to adapt their practices to the different national markets, then the EU can argue that the Regulation is necessary to ensure the functioning of the internal market. But as animal welfare is a legitimate interest of the EU, if the EU is to regulate in order to harmonize national laws, then it should do so in a way that promotes animal welfare.

Article 267 TFEU empowers all national courts to send references for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice of the EU, but does not create an obligation to send such a reference upon the demand of a litigant or upon the mere existence of a question of interpretation of EU law before any national court. However, it follows directly from this article that national courts of last instance are bound to send a reference when a question of EU law interpretation is relevant for the resolution of the case before it.

The principles of direct effect, primacy and EU conform interpretation are all legal tools specific to the EU legal order. However, the principle of legal certainty is a hallmark of any democracy that claims to adhere to the rule of law – that is, all of the Member States of the EU.

Emma can rely on the said provision to force her employer to grant her the four weeks of paid annual leave by invoking the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law. According to the case-law from the ECJ, this principle requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognized by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that a particular directive is fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see Case C-282/10, Dominguez, para. 27). Hence, even if the national law stipulates that Emma’s employer only has to grant paid annual leave to employees who have actually been working during at least half of the reference period (and Emma has admittedly not), the national provision stating that certain absences shall count as periods of actual work should be given an EU conform interpretation, in the sense that Emma’s sick leave should count as a period of actual work for the purposes of calculating the length of her paid leave.

According to Article 51 of the Charter, it applies when EU law is ‘implemented’. In the case-law of the ECJ, this has been interpreted as meaning any situation where EU law is applicable.

The Treaty provides a number of express grounds that will allow a state to justify differences of treatment, such as public security, public health and public order. These express justifications can justify both indirect discrimination, but also direct discrimination.

It is the correlation between a person’s status and unfavorable treatment that constitutes discrimination.

In an area where the Union and the Member States share competence (such as for example, the environment, or consumer protection), then member states can exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not yet exercised its competence. As soon as the Union exercises its competence in that area, by introducing legislation or by entering into an international agreement, for example, then the member states are no longer entitled to exercise their competence. This is the so called ‘doctrine of pre-emption’. The exercise of competence by the Union in that area pre-empts any further exercise of competence by the member states.